



# ***Managing risk in the dairy sector: how futures markets could help***

***Expert Group  
on Agricultural Commodities Derivatives  
and Spot Markets***

***Brussels, 15<sup>th</sup> of March 2017***


***Sophie Helaine and Adamo Uboldi***

*Analysis and Outlook  
DG Agriculture and Rural Development  
European Commission*

## Outline

- 1. Price volatility vs price levels**
- 2. Financial instruments**
- 3. Use of dairy futures in EU, US and NZ**
- 4. Obstacles to the growth of future markets**


## EU and world milk prices




Source: DG Agriculture and Rural Development calculations

# EU dairy volatility (1-y CoV): products comparison

## Dairy products...




## ...and crops




Source: DG Agriculture and Rural Development calculations

## Dairy volatility: geo comparison


### SMP



### Butter



### Raw milk



Source: DG Agriculture and Rural Development calculations

# Financial instruments

## Forward contract

A forward contract is a contract between two parties *to buy (or sell) an asset at a specified future time at a price agreed upon today*, typically traded Over-The-Counter (OTC).

## Future contract

Futures are *standardised* (by quality, quantity, delivery date etc...) forward contracts *centralized/negotiated* at Exchanges. Futures can be based on *physical delivery* of the underlying asset or on *cash-settlement*, i.e. by only making a payment in cash when the contract expires, without physical exchange of goods.

## Option contract

An option *gives the buyer the right, but not the obligation, to buy or sell an underlying asset: the purchase, if the option is exercised*, happens at a pre-specified strike price on a pre-specified maturity date. Important *asymmetry*: the seller of the option has the corresponding *obligation to fulfil the transaction* (to sell or buy) if the buyer exercises the option.

## Financial dairy products available, worldwide


Colour code: **orange** means physical delivery, **light-blue** is cash-settled, **dark-blue** is cash-settled with options available.

	<b>Milk Class III</b>	<b>Milk Class IV</b>	<b>Milk MKP</b>	<b>Butter</b>	<b>Butter oil, AMF, Anhydrous Milk Fat</b>	<b>SMP</b>	<b>WMP</b>	<b>Standard Whey Powder</b>	<b>Cheddar Cheese</b>
<b>New Zealand (USD)</b>			6 000 kg milk solid, yearly (5y) 2016	1 t 18 months 2014	1 t 18 months 2011	1 t 18 months 2011	1 t 18 months 2010		
<b>US (USD)</b>	90 t 24 months 2000	90 t 24 months 2000		9 t 24 months 2005		20 t 24 months 1993		20 t 24 months 2007	9 t 24 months 2010
<b>EU EEX (EUR)</b>				5 t 18 months 2015		5 t 18 months 2015		5 t 18 months 2015	
<b>EU Euronext (EUR)</b>				6 t 18 months 2015		6 t 18 months 2015		6 t 24 months 2015	


Source: Euronext, EEX, CME, NZX.

## Open interest (nearby future, converted into tonnes)

### SMP



### Butter



Source: DG Agriculture and Rural Development based on Thompson Reuters



# Use of dairy futures: larger in the US than in the EU

## Share of open interest over production


	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
<b>EU SMP</b>				0.2%	0.9%
<b>US SMP</b>	3.0%	3.8%	8.0%	11.6%	12.1%
<b>NZ SMP</b>	0.1%	0.7%	0.2%	0.7%	1.1%
<b>NZ WMP</b>	0.3%	0.3%	0.5%	1.1%	1.5%
<b>EU butter</b>				0.1%	0.2%
<b>US butter</b>	4.6%	5.1%	6.3%	6.6%	6.4%
<b>NZ butter</b>	1.7%	0.7%	0.3%	0.7%	0.7%
<b>US milk</b>	2.8%	2.6%	3.8%	3.5%	3.4%
<b>US cheese</b>	1.3%	1.2%	2.8%	4.9%	4.6%

Source: DG Agriculture and Rural Development based on Thompson Reuters and USDA PSD

## Use of dairy futures: increasing trend

### Share of open interest over production

Colours line by line

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
<b>EU SMP</b>				0.2%	0.9%
<b>US SMP</b>	3.0%	3.8%	8.0%	11.6%	12.1%
<b>NZ SMP</b>	0.1%	0.7%	0.2%	0.7%	1.1%
<b>NZ WMP</b>	0.3%	0.3%	0.5%	1.1%	1.5%
<b>EU butter</b>				0.1%	0.2%
<b>US butter</b>	4.6%	5.1%	6.3%	6.6%	6.4%
<b>NZ butter</b>	1.7%	0.7%	0.3%	0.7%	0.7%
<b>US milk</b>	2.8%	2.6%	3.8%	3.5%	3.4%
<b>US cheese</b>	1.3%	1.2%	2.8%	4.9%	4.6%

Source: DG Agriculture and Rural Development based on Thompson Reuters and USDA PSD

## Use of futures for crops: another planet...

### Share of open interest over production


	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
<b>EU wheat</b>	11%	8%	8%	9%	10%
<b>US wheat</b>	100%	95%	96%	97%	95%
<b>US maize</b>	56%	43%	45%	48%	44%
<b>US soybeans</b>	111%	85%	82%	87%	83%
<b>EU rapeseed</b>	21%	14%	13%	17%	19%

Source: DG Agriculture and Rural Development based on Thompson Reuters and USDA PSD

## Use of futures for crops: stable in the EU

### Share of open interest over production

Colours line by line

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
<b>EU wheat</b>	11%	8%	8%	9%	10%
<b>US wheat</b>	100%	95%	96%	97%	95%
<b>US maize</b>	56%	43%	45%	48%	44%
<b>US soybeans</b>	111%	85%	82%	87%	83%
<b>EU rapeseed</b>	21%	14%	13%	17%	19%

Source: DG Agriculture and Rural Development based on Thompson Reuters and USDA PSD

# Trade of futures: again totally different pattern

## Ratio among trade volume and open interest

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
<b>Wheat EU</b>	2.2	2.4	2.8	2.6	2.6
<b>Rapeseed EU</b>	1.9	2.6	2.4	2.4	2.8
<b>Wheat US</b>	5.1	5.1	5.5	6.5	5.9
<b>Maize US</b>	5	4.5	4.5	5.2	5.4
<b>Soybeans US</b>	6.4	6.8	6.4	6.6	7.2
<b>SMP EU</b>				0.8	0.3
<b>Butter EU</b>				0.4	0.4
<b>SMP US</b>	0.3	0.5	0.6	0.7	0.7
<b>Butter US</b>	0.3	0.5	0.5	0.4	0.5
<b>Milk III US</b>	0.9	1.1	0.9	0.7	0.8
<b>Milk IV US</b>	0.2	0.5	0.3	0.4	0.3
<b>Cheese US</b>	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.3
<b>SMP NZ</b>			1	0.7	0.4
<b>WMP NZ</b>	0.4	0.4	0.7	0.7	0.6
<b>Butter NZ</b>				0.8	0.7
<b>AMF NZ</b>			0.9	0.6	0.5

Source: DG Agriculture and Rural Development based on Thompson Reuters

## How hedging works in practice

- **FOR THE BUYER:** *a hedging strategy on a **long position** is rather easy. The owner of a contract will buy in the future (precisely at maturity) the underlying asset at a price known today.*
- **FOR THE SELLER:** *viceversa, a hedging strategy on a **short position** could be slightly more complicated...*  
*In growing order of complexity, we go through a series of*
- **WORKED EXAMPLES:** *'today' is the negotiation day, explicitly stated, around Aug-Sep 2016. Maturities have been selected for particular intrinsic interest: May 2017 for the next seasonal peak in production, and December 2016 for a complete ex-post evaluation.*
- **REAL MARKET DATA:** *figures quoted are rounded to make them more readable.*



## Example 1, "the locker"


- **TARGET:** a dairy processor wants to secure his revenue for selling 5 t of SMP by fixing the selling price of his dairy commodity in advance.
- **MARKET DATA:** on the **9th of September 2016** the EU market price for SMP is 1 900 EUR/t. On the same day, these are the prices of SMP contracts:

Maturity	Sept 2016	Oct 2016	Nov 2016	May 2017
SMP (EUR/t)	2 090	2 140	2 130	<b>2 290</b>

Source: EEX.


- **HEDGING STRATEGY:** regardless of the physical price today, the processor **sells today a contract of SMP** with expiry date May 2017. **At maturity, the processor physically sells his SMP** on the physical market, **AND buys back the SMP contract** at market price, thus cancelling the previous commitment (i.e. netting his 'financial' position).
- **2 SCENARIOS:** "up" from 1 900 EUR/t today to 2 500 EUR/t **(+600 EUR/t)**, and "down" from 1 900 EUR/t today to 1 800 EUR/t **(-100 EUR/t)**.

## Example 1, "the locker": scenario "down"





## Example 1, "the locker": scenario "up"



## Wrap up: Example 1, "the locker"



**Whatever the future outcome on the market** (scenario 1 assumes an increasing price while scenario 2 assumes a decreasing one), **the net final result in both cases is exactly the initial value of the futures contract**, an amount already known since the beginning (EUR 11 450).

This is exactly what **'securing revenues'** means: the original target of the processor was exactly to have a known and **market-evolution-unrelated guaranteed price**.

The hedging strategy works perfectly, provided that:

- at maturity futures contract price and spot price **converge**;
- the underlying price of the futures contract is a **'representative price'**, really reflecting the specific spot market's conditions.



## Example 2, the "shock absorber"


- **TARGET:** a cooperative is selling raw milk but since there is no milk futures contract in Europe it has to hedge on dairy products such as butter and SMP.
- **MARKET DATA:** on the **14th of August 2016** the EU market price for SMP and butter is respectively 1 780 EUR/t and 3 290 EUR/t. On the same day, these are the prices of SMP and butter contracts:

Maturity	Sept 2016	Oct 2016	Nov 2016	Dec 2016
SMP (EUR/t)	1 940	2 000	2 020	<b>2 040</b>
Butter (EUR/t)	4 100	3 990	3 960	<b>4 000</b>


Source: EEX.

- **HEDGING STRATEGY:** regardless of the physical price today, the cooperative **sells today a portfolio made of 1 contract of butter and 2 contracts of SMP** at December prices. **At maturity**, the cooperative **sells its milk production** according to prevalent market condition **and buys back the portfolio** (1 contract of butter and 2 of SMP) at market prices, thus cancelling the previous commitment.
- **2 SCENARIOS:** "up" and "down" for both SMP and butter.

## Example 2, "shock absorber": scenario "down"



## Example 2, "shock absorber": scenario "up"



## Wrap up: Example 2, the "shock absorber"


**Whatever the future outcome on the market** (scenario 1 has increasing prices while scenario 2 has decreasing ones), **the net final result** in both cases **is not too far from 33 EUR/100 kg** (i.e. the expected future milk value implied by the December contracts on SMP and butter), an amount already known today.

This is exactly what **'protect revenues'** means: the original target of the processor was exactly to have a known and **market-evolution-softened guaranteed price**.


The hedging strategy works perfectly, provided that:

- at maturity futures contract price and spot price **converge**;
- the underlying price of the futures contract is a **'representative price'**, really reflecting the specific spot market's conditions.

## Example 3, "the button": scenario "up"




## Example 3, "the button": scenario "down"





## Wrap up: "locker", shock absorber" and "button"



## Conclusions

- *Volatility of dairy products prices is significantly higher than the historical level of the early 2000s (though lower than in 2007).*
- *Financial tools, such as futures and options could really contribute to reduce risks for dairy farmers/processors, especially in times characterized by relatively high volatility and low prices.*
- *Specific futures for dairy markets have recently been introduced in the EU. The volumes traded are still low but a growing interest for these contracts is observed, especially by the end of 2016.*
- *In the dairy sector, cash-settled contracts may be more suited rather than physical delivery contracts.*
- *In the US, where dairy futures have been available for a longer period, the open interest (number of open contracts) for SMP represents 12% of the domestic production. The open interest for SMP in EU futures is significantly increasing but only close to 1% of the EU production.*

## Main obstacles

*Several obstacles are reported to affect the expansion and the use of futures and options in the dairy sector:*

- *dairy products are not as homogenous as grains/crops;*
- *liquidity is still low;*
- *the amount of knowledge required to handle these instruments is high, and lacking in the sector.*

## **Other obstacles to the growth of future markets**

- *High transaction/intermediation/brokerage cost, plus margin calls*
- *Public support policies providing alternative methods of risk reduction*
- *Local prices are not strongly correlated with world or EU futures prices*
- *Convergence of spot and futures prices*

### **More specifically on dairy**

- *Size of contracts, too large for a single farmer*
- *Physical delivery vs cash-settled contracts*
- *Lack of a "Representative Price"*
- *Still perceived as speculative tools...*

## **Final key message**

**Many of the issues are already (on the way to be) solved or clearly reduced in impact. On the production side, cooperatives and producer organisations could play a crucial role, centralizing hedging thus reducing the burden for individual farmers.**