

# Market incompleteness. The benefits of OTC contracts derived or not from futures markets

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Meeting of the expert group on agricultural  
commodity derivatives and spot markets,  
Brussels, April 18, 2018

# OTC contracts derived or not from futures markets

## Two studies

- « *Utilisation des marchés à terme par les acteurs commerciaux exposés à la volatilité des marchés de grains et du sucre* » (2016), Sigma Terme study for French Ministry of Agriculture, Paris, 135 p.
- « *Study on risk management in EU Agriculture* » (2017 – **unpublished**), Ecorys/Wageningen UR study for DG Agri, Brussels, 202 p. + 8 case studies
  - Case studies no 1 + 2 + 3 on climatic and sanitary insurance
  - **Case study no 4 on multiannual price risk management (OTC contracts)**
  - Case study no 5 on mutual fund art. 68 (production risk)
  - **Case study no 6 on mutual fund art. 69 (Income stabilisation Tool)**
  - Case study no 7 and 8 on the US and Canadian risk management system


## Two horizons for price risk management by OTC contracts

- One year : production cycle
- Multi year : investment cycle

OTC contracts derived or not from futures markets

- 1. Market incompleteness => a need for public policy**
- 2. OTC contracts with futures markets**
- 3. OTC contracts without futures markets**
  - Spot price formulas
  - Price swaps
  - Margin swaps
  - Limits of swaps
- 4. Implication for a public policy**
  - Measures for reducing market incompleteness
  - Instruments to support contract durability


# European farmers have been only recently exposed to volatility




N. Ferenczi, Ulysses 1<sup>st</sup> International Seminar, 27 March 2014

## EU milk price (1990-2018)


(European Milk Market Observatory)



## US, NZ and EU milk prices up to January 2018



# Risk management instruments




Source: adapted from Cordier and Guinvarc'h (2002)

Case study no 4: Multiannual price risk management (unpublished)

# 1. Market incompleteness

- Sub-optimal production decisions (types and means of prod.)
- Sub-optimal investment decisions (technology adapt., lack of credit)  
**=> Loss of productivity and competitiveness**
- Few liquid futures markets on EU agricultural products (wheat, maize, rapeseed, sugar)
- Insurance contracts in EU countries but with low uptake rates
- Cooperatives are major risk management instruments in some EU Member States
- A risk management toolkit within CAP 2014-2020 that failed due to various constraints ... and farmers' fear of budget transfer
- 72 % of the EU agricultural budget spent on direct payments to support farmers income. **But direct payments are not a risk management instrument.** Just a wealth effect that may allow risk taking.

# 1. Market incompleteness



Source: adapted from Cordier and Guinvarc'h (2002)

Case study no 4: Multiannual price risk management (unpublished)



# 2. OTC contracts with futures markets

<b>Contracts on futures markets</b>	Futures contract (elicitation of future prices)
	Options on futures contract (elicitation of future volatility)
<b>OTC cash contracts</b>	<b>Basic OTC contracts</b>
	Spot contract (spot price)
	Forward contract (forward price = futures price and basis fixed)
	Basis contract (fixed basis value, futures price to be fixed)
	Hedge To Arrive (futures price fixed, basis to be fixed)
	Minimum price contract (option derivative = call or synthetic call)


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	Minimum price contract (option derivative = call or synthetic call)
	<b>Structured contracts</b>
	Pool price contract (offered by cooperatives)
	Market price average on specific periods
	Tunnels, participative and exotic options (kickout, lookback, ...)
	Contracts on margin (insurance hybrids)

## 2.1. Use of contracts by farmers



- Survey of financial intermediaries (2016) : estimated 2 000 active accounts for 300 000 grain farmers in France => less than 1%  
=> Marginal direct use of futures markets by farmers
- Dominant pooling price through cooperatives (60%)  
... but benchmark from futures markets (computed average prices)
- Farmers diversified between « basic » and « structured » contracts

*Estimated change in % of fixed price with respect to market price*




Source : auteur

## 2.2. Use of contracts by Grain Merchandisers (GM)



Source : Auteur



Source : Auteur sur données Reuters

### Futures contracts MATIF

- Rapeseed 1994
- Wheat 1996
- Corn 1999


# Use of contracts by Grain Merchandisers

Contract name	Delivey	Price elicitation	Percentage of use w.r.t. total crop
<b>Basis contract</b> (« Against Actuals »)	Differed	Basis fixed « Against Actuals » = swap of futures position in exchange for cash positions (governed by exchange rules)	61%
<b>Fixed price contracts</b>	Spot	Futures price + basis	22%
	Differed		
	Multiple delivery		
<b>Delayed pricing contract</b>	Differed	Fixed volume and quality Fixed storage costs	14%
<b>Various indexed contracts</b>	Differed	Fixation partielle ou totale et différée, indexée sur le MATIF	1%
<b>Tunnels/options/other structured contracts</b>	Spot	Structured prices	2%
	Differed		

# Use of futures contracts by Grain Merchandisers


## Rapeseed contract

- 102 % of weighted crop hedged
- 71% of GM hedge more than 90%




## Wheat contract

- 98 % of weighted crop hedged
- 52% of GM hedge more than 90%



## Corn contract

- 43 % of weighted crop hedged
- 58% of GM hedge more than 50%



# Production cycle with futures markets (in France)

- From the farmer situation
  - More pooling price than fixed price
  - Indirect use of futures markets (information and OTC contracts)
  - Diversified marketing strategies
  - Impact of low or high prices on portfolios
- From the grain merchandiser situation
  - Large use of futures markets (mainly with « Against Actuals »)
  - Strong issue of basis risk and price convergence
- From the end user situation (feed, crush, milling, processing)
  - Large use of futures markets (also using « Against Actuals »)
  - Strong demand of AA (liquidity, transaction costs, secrecy)

Therefore:

- Futures markets are required as reference markets (grain, dairy, livestock, fertilizer, index, ...),
- OTC markets are developing with contract innovation,
- **It takes years for the learning process** when shifting from regulated to competitive markets.

# Message

- About twenty years of maturation on the grain market in France (1997-2017) = **a success but a long process**
- Still questions on hedging performance
  - maize (Rhine and Atlantic market)
  - Basis volatility ... and adequate convergence
- Limits of cross-hedging
  - malting barley, durum wheat, sunflower, rapeseed meal, ...
  - Dairy products versus milk farmgate price
  - Sugar/ alcohol versus sugar beet



### 3. OTC contracts without futures markets

- Examples
  - spot price formulas
  - price swaps
  - margin swaps
- The limits of swaps

### 3.1. Spot price formulas (examples)

- Formula pricing:

The effective price paid to farmers is computed periodically using spot signals and a calculus formula

- FrieslandCampina (NL):

The average EU milk price as observed weekly on a panel of dairy companies is paid to cooperative members as a minimum price. An annual bonus may be added in relation with the cooperative efficiency

- Sodiaal (FR):

« Price A » for « Volume A », the EU domestic demand based upon European references on consumer and industrial products and « Price B » for « Volume B », the international market (mainly industrial products).

- Etc.


## Comments:

- Widely used: a broad set of contracts
- Market references required
- Limited price risk management
- Potential for improvement (futures markets with OTC derivatives or swaps)

## 3.2. Price swaps


**Swap = fixed price against (volatile) market price**

Example Herta – Porc Armor Evolution



- **Principle** = Opposite market risks within the food chain
- Pure financial contract
- One year contract (potential for multi-year contract)
- Limited output percentage of pig producer


# Practically



- Tunnel 1 = PP +/- 0.05 €/kg
- Tunnel 2 = PP +/- 0.10 €/kg

Compensateur : HERTA			Compensateur : éleveur	
< PP-0,10	-0,10≤PP<-0,05	-0,05≤ PP≤+0,05	+0,05<PP≤+0,10	>PP+0,10
compensation :				
50%	75%	100%	75%	50%

# Practically



- Set PP = 1.35 €/Kg
- Market price (MP):
  - Case 1: MP = 1.38 €/Kg (**within tunnel 1**)  
Producer is paying  $(100\% \times 0.03) = 0.03$  €/Kg to Herta
  - Case 2: MP = 1.28 €/Kg (**within tunnel 2**)  
Herta is paying  $(100\% \times 0.05) + (75\% \times 0.02) = 0.065$  €/Kg
  - Case 3: MP = 1.21 €/Kg (**out of tunnel 2**)  
Herta is paying  $(100\% \times 0.05) + (75\% \times 0.05) + (50\% \times 0.04) = 0.1075$  €/Kg
- Symmetry of the contract (caps and floors)

### 3.3. Margin swaps

**Swap = fixed margin against (volatile) market margin**

Examples: Glanbia / milk and Agromousquetaires / pig

- **Principle** = opposite market risks within the food chain
- Price formula pricing for a stabilized margin
- Multi-year contracts (three to five years)
- Limited output percentage of pig producer
- **The processor is paying the price for a fixed producer margin with respect to a volatile input costs**
- The input costs considered are operational random costs (basically feed costs)
- Feed costs are computed ex post (Glanbia) or ex ante (Intermarché) using futures markets



## Practically: Glanbia (IRL) margin swap The Fixed Milk Price scheme (Glanbia-FMP)



- Glanbia: dairy cooperative (16,000 members)
- « *Price volatility, a key market challenge* »
- Four complementary instruments (FMP, flex loan repayment, advance payment scheme, coop specific support)
- Phase 8 (since 211) = « ***a long journey*** » to design OTC contracts for **price risk management**
- A three-year contract (now five years)
- Each month, Glanbia is fixing the milk price  $P$  to producers
- $P = \text{Feed } \mathbf{\textit{indexed}} \text{ costs} + \text{Fixed costs} + \text{« } \textit{Protected} \text{ » producer Margin}$
- $\text{Feed costs} = f ( S_{\text{purchased feed}} + S_{\text{local forage}} )$  with  $S$  spot prices
- Glanbia is backing the margin swap with contracts with final users of industrial products (butter and skimmed milk powder)
- Glanbia is providing a « market adjuster » in case of extreme events (loss share 50/50)



# Practically: Agromousquetaires margin swap



- Agromousquetaires: 10 food chains (60 plants with 19 700 farmers) of food stores « Intermarché ». Dairy, pig, beef, biscuits, fish, ...



- March 2017 => producers/prod. group/Agromousquetaires
- A five-year contract / Max 50% of individual pig production
- Each 1st day of trimestre, Intermarché is fixing the price for pigs to be slaughtered six months later (i.e. January for June-July-August)
- $F_{\text{pig}} = \text{Indexed feed costs} + \text{Fixed costs} + \text{Fixed Margin}$
- Feed costs =  $f ( F_{\text{wheat}} + F_{\text{sojameal}} )$  with F futures prices of wheat/sojameal
- If fixed pig price as formula priced is inducing much higher margin than market margin, there is a « **market adjuster** » based on **cash advance** by Agromousquetaires
- To be extended to other food chains

# General message of price and margin swaps

- There is a capacity (and a willingness) of the food chain to manage price risk (price smoothing by risk exchange)
- Need to choose the right partners (**direct relationship** Herta/Porc Armor and AgroMousquetaires/Aveltis-Prestor or **back-to-back** contracts Glanbia)
- Need for quality of signature for contract integrity (swap dealer job)
- Major role of producers groups (training, quality of signature)
- Requirement of « market adjusters » in case of extreme market situations
  - Gain/loss rate of participation
  - Cash advance
  - Other ?

## 4. Implications for a public policy – Conclusion

- OTC contracts are major instruments for price risk management (for both production and investment cycles)
- Traditional **futures markets are necessary** (when feasible)

Required public policy: « **public market information = quantity, quality, up-to-date** »

**Crucial** = DG Agri Market Observatories, Dashboards and Outlook

Sujet	Expéditeur	Date
Agricultural market dashboards - MILK AND MILK PRODUCTS	• agri-newsdigest@ec.europa.eu	13/04/2018 15:40
Agricultural market dashboards - OILSEEDS	• agri-newsdigest@ec.europa.eu	13/04/2018 15:20
Agricultural market dashboards - CEREALS	• agri-newsdigest@ec.europa.eu	13/04/2018 15:10
EU Meat Market Observatory (Meat MO) Template update - 13/04/2018	• agri-newsdigest@ec.europa.eu	13/04/2018 10:10
Agricultural market dashboards - BEEF	• agri-newsdigest@ec.europa.eu	13/04/2018 10:00
Agricultural market dashboards - SHEEP MEAT	• agri-newsdigest@ec.europa.eu	12/04/2018 10:50
European Milk Market Observatory - update	• agri-newsdigest@ec.europa.eu	12/04/2018 10:30
EU Meat Market Observatory (Meat MO) Template update - 12/04/2018	• agri-newsdigest@ec.europa.eu	12/04/2018 09:50
Agricultural market dashboards - PIGMEAT	• agri-newsdigest@ec.europa.eu	12/04/2018 09:30
Agricultural market dashboards - POULTRY MEAT	• agri-newsdigest@ec.europa.eu	11/04/2018 17:20
Agricultural market dashboards - EGGS update	• agri-newsdigest@ec.europa.eu	11/04/2018 17:10

1 = almost up to date

Last update : 04.04.2018

# DG AGRI DASHBOARD: DAIRY PRODUCTS

## EU Prices

EU Price  
Jan-2018

Raw Milk

35.6

€/100 kg

- 4.7%

Evolution since

EU Prices  
(week 13)

BUTTER

487

€/100 kg

+ 1.2%

Compared to the  
previous 4 weeks

S.M.P.

132

€/100 kg

- 0.9%

W.M.P.

261

€/100 kg

+ 0.3%


CHEDDAR

327

€/100 kg

+ 0.9%

EU Raw Milk Prices Evolution (up to February 2018\*)




2 = data base for reference

## World Quotations

	Price in USD/Tonne on 1.04.2018			% change (15 days ago)		
	EU	Oceania	USA	EU	Oceania	USA
Butter	6 071	5 275	4 828	↗ +3.6%	↘ -0.9%	↘ -1.0%
SMP	1 626	1 938	1 531	↘ -0.8%	↗ +4.0%	↗ +0.5%
WMP	3 210	3 225	3 252	↗ +0.3%	↘ -0.4%	nc
Cheddar	3 980	3 625	3 390	↘ -0.2%	↘ -4.9%	↘ -1.9%

US, NZ and EU milk prices up to January 2018



3 = world wide

## 4. Implications for a public policy – Conclusion


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- Traditional futures markets are necessary (when feasible)

Required public policy: a **public market information = quantity, quality, up-to-date**

- A great innovative capacity of food chains to manage price risks through swaps (with or without futures markets)

Required public policy: **integrated mutual fund IST art. 39** for (1) OTC contract durability and (2) design improvement

# Improvement and durability of Swaps (OTC contracts)



A great need of sharing projects, studies and experiences  
= the expected EU platform on risk management

## 4. Implications for a public policy – Conclusion

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Required public policy: the development of an **EU platform on risk management**

- the actuarial model of mutual funds (IST) => fair competition
- common market references (public infor. system)
- share of studies, projects and experiences

Thank you for your attention